A PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC FOR THE CLASSICAL MUSIC 'INDUSTRY'

[A paper I presented on the philosophy of classical music, and the music-making industry].

Perhaps since music began, the problem has plagued us: whether music car justifiably exist outside its social context? With deference to my opponents, I believe it is time that we restored music to its hallowed place in the aesthetic fold. Despite this conviction, I am willing to engage with the views expressed by certain social theorists with regard to music's social role. In particular, I am eager to tackle the problem of ideology - specifically discussing how ideology does or does not impact upon Music's aesthetic function. Throughout this discussion, I will be examining the complex views of Chris Ballantine and Lucy Green.

Of course, a decisive factor in pursuing my aesthetic line will be to define the Aesthetic Position. While it may be impossible to establish fully a theory or metaphysic of aesthetics, I will strive to show what an aesthetic attitude is and what is not in relation to music's transcendent purpose. In order to pursue my inquiry, I will critique the arguments of celebrated modernist, Theodor Adorno. As a classic of aesthetics, Adorno's argument will provide a critical access to the remainder of my paper. Given that Adorno's views are quite technical, I will refer the reader in the discussion to a concrete musical example to illustrate my point.

In the "finale" of my investigation, I will consider a synthetic approach to the subject of musical meaning and culture. In order to this objective, I will expound the views of Gilbert Chase (which I find most instructive with regard to musical analysis), and outline his complete musical approach. Leaving my reader with some reflective observations on music's aesthetic purpose, I will conclude with comments by eminent musicologist, Deryck Cooke.

ADORNO: MODERNISM AND AESTHETICS

In the introduction to his 'Philosophy of Modern Music1, Adorno sets out - in part - the first principles of an aesthetic approach to music: in so doing, he demonstrates the limits of a purely social concept of musical expression. Evincing an altruistic regard for "sincere" musical conscience, compositional quality and for honest artistic effort, Adorno reveals a number of fundamental problems concerning the "culture industry" and its stylistic approach to musical judgment. (Broadly speaking, Adorno defines the culture industry as the commercial entertainment sector).

In principle, Adorno's aesthetics are extremely lucid. Since 'predetermined stylistic categories’ are condemned to "orbit the nature of form", Adorno demonstrates that a social concept of music will always fail to connect with music's ultimate goals. In support of his thesis, Adorno emphasises how entertainers and "self-appointed mediators" have taken responsibility for composers' finances and thus their productivity, sacrificing, in the process, musical creativity to public taste. As Adorno warns, this process will occur at the expense of pursuing musical exploration for its own sake; and musical meaning as an object-in-itself. By virtue of his reasoning, therefore, Adorno points to the "abyss" which has developed between musical insight and public perception.

The logic of Adorno's argument may be summed up by Hegel, whom he quotes: "The appetite of the consumer is, to be sure, less concerned with the feeling for which ( a) work of art stands than with the feeling which it excites, namely, the sum of pleasure which he hopes to garner" (My emphasis).

In spite of his philosophical rectitude, Adorno defines music in overtly political, or dialectical terms. Stating the view explicitly, Adorno is convinced that music can only make sense through the excesses of development - and from that poi of departure, he demands that we seek a "meaningful juxtaposition of. .. antitheses (i the works of different composers and musical styles) inherent in these opposing extremes". Later yet, he professes that "historical force, the 'rage and fury of destruction', prohibits an aesthetic compromise, just as it would prohibit compromise in the 'political sphere" (My emphasis).

While they might initially seem benign, Adorno's comments could have disastrous repercussions for art and free musical expression. Denouncing it as the "new conformism", Adorno states that the vast majority of modern music is "facile" and subject to a "history of decline". In keeping with this statement, Adorno has little time for the music of Milhaud, Hindemith, Britten, Elgar, Sibelius, Tchaikovsky or Shostakovich. At the same time, he cannot abide the practiced "intellectualism" of Bach, Beethoven and Brahms. Indeed, Adorno appears to care for few composers apart from Stravinsky (whose pupils he does not admire) or Schoenberg and his twelve-tone/serial technique. By admission, therefore, Adorno assumes an extreme position in respect of musical progress. I would argue this should be interpreted as an ideological bias. Hence, I will now examine the problem of ideology and its influence on music’s aesthetic core.

THE PROBLEM OF 'IDEOLOGY': GREENE AND BALLANTINE

In 'Maintaining aesthetic difference ,2, Lucy Greene labels classical music as the dominant ideology (an ideology of "autonomy and fetishism") of the bourgeoisie: she subsequently attacks the way in which classical music enforces a social "rift" between itself and popular music through its aesthetic of pure musical expression. Throughout her rather complex argument, Greene contends that classical music has set itself above popular music by arrogating some transcendent essence or value. According to Greene, classical music's "universal" values have caused a divide to emerge between bourgeois culture and pop music's catalogue of "ordinary" experience. Since classical music is the arbiter of universal meaning, however, pop's advocates are forced either to confront the classical music establishment or to resign themselves to classical music's bourgeois norms.

Despite this concern, there is both a logical and a practical difficulty with Greene's thesis. In the first step of her argument, she presupposes that there is a unity - or consensus - within the diverse tradition of classical music. From this pre­supposition, it is easy for Greene to waylay the reader into her system of 'social dominance'. Given that I am a classical musician, I also wish to provide a practical musical example, which should highlight the problem with Greene's position.

As Adorno has emphasised, the music of arch-modernist, Arnold Schoenberg was received with extreme hostility and "incomprehension" at its first reception. Although famous conductors and composers - such as Mahler and Bartok - sponsored Schoenberg's radical aims, Schoenberg was never owned by the bourgeois establishment. Despite the proliferation of his academic theories, Schoenberg's music is still considered peripheral and avant-garde. My point I wish to make is that  although Schoenberg was admired by the most able judges of 'classical music', the bourgeois concert-goer has not followed suit.

The ideological assumptions of Chris Ballantine, I think, are far more disturbing. In 'Music and society: the forgotten relationship ,3, Ballantine forces a Marxist model of musical progress on his readership. At page six, Ballantine confesses that he is "indebted to the Marxist tradition" for its attack on the 'deceits and rationalizations' of bourgeois musical theory. Throughout his (tendentious) article, Ballantine presumes that his readers are 'all' " "members of the bourgeoisie" and proponents of "affirmative bourgeois music". In consequence, Ballantine claims that his readers are unanimously victims of aesthetics and dupes of the bourgeoisie's 'false/disfigured/distorted' consciousness of musical value.

As with Adorno before him, Ballantine is guilty of an ideological assumption and of applying the dialectic method to musical analysis. (It-is no surprise, therefore, that Ballantine considers Adorno to have made, within the last century, the most "unique" advances in musical scholarship). Ballantine unwittingly highlights the shortcomings of his Marxist-historical approach to musical meaning by providing some false examples of social influence or 'motivation'. The premise behind his examples is that: "social structures crystallise in musical structures; that in various ways and with varying degrees of critical awareness, the 'musical microcosm replicates the social macrocosm' " (My emphasis). Thus in Ballantine's system, there is little room for the disinterested pursuit of musical form and beauty - that is to say, artistic truth or aesthetics.

Having expounded his system, I will next treat with his examples. Early in his discussion, Ballantine draws an analogy between the scientific revolution of the renaissance and the discipline of musicology - just as disinterest was a scientific paradigm developed in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries to fight against the Church's dominance, Ballantine claims that musicology is a paradigm to entrench bourgeois values within the Western social hierarchy. In the 'Life of Galli/eo " however, Bertold Brecht show_how there might be two problems with Ballantine's perspective. On the one hand, Brecht suggests that Gallileo (the archetype of disinterest) pursued his research almost wholly for personal inspiration and enlightenment, not for social patronage. On the other hand, Brecht reiterates the preface that the truth of this proposition need not matter, since Brecht's life of Galli1eo is primarily a creative work of art. If the 'Life of Gallileo ' inspires the reader, then Brecht has accomplished his purpose.

Two more of Ballantine's examples are sufficient for my purpose. In Ballantine's opinion, the music of J.S. Bach was the cope-stone and buttress of the ancien regime. While Bach undoubtedly composed for royal patrons - such as the Marquis of Brandenburg - he thought far beyond the 'stylistic conventions' of his time. Thus, Bach combined the Italian aria, the Lutheran chorale and the English suite to produce a unique, cosmopolitan sound which appeals yet to our 'universal humanity'. Given his flair and perspicacity, it is no wonder that Bach was imprisoned; that he was neither popular with his diocese nor with the University authorities in Leipzig. In a similar fashion, Ballantine asserts that Beethoven wrote in support of the "New Order" of bourgeois democracy. Though he vociferously opposed the feudal aristocracy, Beethoven always claimed that he was an artist, not a politician. (On his death-bed, he is reported to have said: " I know at least in thi_ life, I was an artist"). Whereas one may construe 'Fidelio' as an individual's struggle against the State, one must also accept that Beethoven admired "heroic men" like Napoleon. In any case, Beethoven (with his dedication to art and the Gospel) believed in genius - and in the freedom and beauty of the individual soul. Since there is at least a nominal social input in music, how can we reconcile this with music's overarching aesthetic form?

GILBERT CHASE AND HIS SYNTHETIC SOLUTION

In 'Musicology, history, and anthropology 4, Gilbert Chase paves a very fruitful path towards the 'musical synthesis of social reality and music's pure aesthetic goals. Chase accomplishes his objective by adopting an interdisciplinary approach to musical meaning and analysis. Through this programme, Chase seeks to overcome the insularity which has characterised Western music, by joining the disciplines of musicology and ethnomusicology. Consistent with this objective, Chase hopes to develop an aesthetic anthropology of Man which is based on the diachronic - ie. Universal/developmental - not synchronic – ideological/political - traits of human communication. Drawing on the writing of Levi-Strauss, Chase emphasises how this synthesis will allow for the expression of different musics; and most importanly for their incorporation into a universally relevant system of musical expression. Already, musical analysts could find such aims in the works of Gustav Mahler, Bela Bartok and Leos Janacek, etc, which combine the dynamics of their respective cultures with the innate, soulful language of music.

CONCLUSION: DERYCK COOKE

In closing, I would like to leave the reader with two inspiring passages by Deryck Cooke. They summarise beautifully music's ongoing purpose and aesthetic power:

1). "We may say then that, whatever else the mysterious art known as music may eventually be found to express, it is primarily and basically a language of the emotions, through which we directly experience the fundamental urges that move mankind, without the need of falsifying ideas and images - words or pictures"5.

2). "The composer, expressing unconscious emotions in the inexplicit language of music, and often not fully realizing himself exactly what he is saying, does indeed 'give himself away': being certain that whatever he has said can only be felt by the musically sensitive, and not clearly identified, explained and discussed, he can let out all that he obscurely feels in the depths of his being, while still remaining- 'silent' ".

1 Theodor Adorno, "Introduction, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. A Mitchell & W Bloomster, London, Sheed & Ward, 1973 [1948], pp 3-28.

2 Lucy Green, "Maintaining Aesthetic Difference", Ch 8 in Music on Deaf Ears: Musical Meaning, Ideology and Education, Manchester, MUP, 1988, pp 102-20.

3 Christopher Ballantine, "Music and Society: the Forgotten Relationship", Ch 1 in Music and its Social Meanings, NY, Gordon & Breach, 1984.

4 Gilbert Chase, "Musicology, History and Anthropology" in Current Thought in Musicology, Austin & London, University of Texas Press, 1976, pp 231-46.

5 Deryck Cooke, “The Language of Music”, Ch 5, London, NY & Toronto, Oxford University Press , pp  272-73.